Operational Experiences With High-Volume Network Intrusion Detection

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High-Volume Network Intrusion Detection

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- Experience with open-source NIDSs in Gbps environments:
 - Snort dropped lots of packets \Rightarrow CPU load too high
 - Bro additionally consumed all memory \Rightarrow stores too much state

Questions

- Key factors in terms of resource usage?
- Ways to reduce resource consumption?
- Impact on detection rate?
- No answers available
 - Researchers often lack access to high-volume environments
 - Commercial vendors keep their techniques private

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- 2 Operational Experiences
- 3 Extensions to the NIDS
- 4 Trade-Off: Detection Rate vs. Resource Usage

Operational environments


- Munich Scientific Network
- University of California, Berkeley
- Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
- Main research environment: Munich Scientific Network
 - Two major universities and several research institutes
 - Gbps Internet uplink transferring 1-2 TB each day
 - 50,000 hosts; 65,000 users
 - Monitor: Dual Athlon 1800+, FreeBSD 5.2.1
- Traces augment our study to demonstrate challenges

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- Powerful open-source NIDS
- Research project started in 1995
- Supports different approaches to intrusion detection
- Focuses on
 - Semantically high-level analysis
 - Efficiency
 - Extensibility
 - Resistance to evasion
 - Separation of mechanism and policy

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
- **Operational Experiences** Memory Consumption CPU Consumption
- Extensions to the NIDS
- Trade-Off: Detection Rate vs. Resource Usage




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- Stateful NIDS maintains representation of network's state
 - The more it knows about the network the more it can detect
- Connection state
 - Instantiated when connection starts
 - Removed when connection ends
- User state
 - NIDS may provide scripting language for customizations
 - Data structures store state (e.g., arrays)
 - User is responsible to delete state eventually


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
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
Observation Many established connections are not deleted


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
Avoiding evasion is design goal


- Only delete connection state when it is safe
- Problem
 - Not feasible in high-volume environments
- Approaches to expire connection prematurely
 - Limit number of connections in memory
 - Limit total amount of connection state memory
 - Limit connection life-time with inactivity time-outs
- Trade-Off
 - Memory-consumption vs. detection rate

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





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Observation

Much of the user state is not deleted



- Avoiding evasion is design goal
 - Detecting all scans requires remembering all connections
- Problem
 - Again not feasible in high-volume environments
- Added mechanisms to expire user state
 - Ease deleting state explicitly
 - Allow deleting state implicitly via time-outs
- Adapted default scripts to make use of them

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Environments



- CPU Consumption
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
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CPU Consumption


- When analysis exceeds available time packet drops occur
- Major reason: network load exceeds processing capacity
 - Current commodity hardware cannot analyze every packet
 - Need to find a tractable subset of traffic
- Problem: Internet traffic is very dynamic
 - Long-term effects: time-of-day and day-of-week
 - Short-term effects: traffic is multi-fractal
 - Anomalies: worms, floods, misbehaving software
- Hard to predict time even for well-understood traffic
 - Per-packet processing time varies widely
 - Processing spikes triggered by individual packets

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• Example: Running times for different depths of analysis




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
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Example: Running times for different depths of analysis




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




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Processing Spikes


• Example: Spikes triggered by a single packet



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Processing Spikes

• Example: Spikes triggered by a single packet




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Processing Spikes

Example: Spikes triggered by a single packet



Environments

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- Extensions to the NIDS

4 Trade-Off: Detection Rate vs. Resource Usage

New time-outs

- Automatically expire internal and user state
- Connection compressor
 - Defers instantiation of connection state
- Load-levels
 - Adapt the NIDS's configuration to the current network load
 - Measure load by either CPU usage or packet drops
- Flood-detector
 - Excludes flood victim from analysis

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Trade-Off: Detection Rate vs. Resource Usage

Usual trade-off in computer science

- Time vs. memory
- Network Intrusion Detection
 - Detection rate vs. resource usage
- Bro's design emphasizes detection
- High-volume environments require different trade-off
- Trade-off is policy decision left to the user
- Variant of Kerkhoff's principle avoids predictability
 - Detection mechanisms are public
 - Environment-specific parameterizations are private

Network intrusion detection in high-volume environments

- Unusual trade-off between detection rate and resource usage
- Dynamic traffic makes it hard to find a stable point of operation
- Our work
 - Thorough understanding of the trade-off
 - Tuning mechanisms to successfully operate the system
- Outlook
 - Deploying specialized monitoring hardware
 - Refining measurement models
 - Developing auto-configuration tool
 - Adapting to still larger link capacities

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Artifacts of the monitoring environment

- · Limits imposed by commodity PC hardware
- Merging of multiple Gbps into one
- Router-side buffer overruns
- Optical-taps: uni-directional

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Artifacts of the monitoring environment

- · Limits imposed by commodity PC hardware
- Merging of multiple Gbps into one
- Router-side buffer overruns
- Optical-taps: uni-directional

Programming deficiencies will be severely punished

- Expecting any sort of "reasonable" traffic is sure to fail
- Memory leaks are a major hassle

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