



Cyber Crime Past, Present and Future!

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Agenda

- **About Trustwave's SpiderLabs and Source of Data**
- **Global view of Cyber Crime**
 - Reactive Engagements: Incident Response
 - Proactive Engagements: Penetration Testing
- **Malware Landscape Today**
- **Anatomy of a Successful Malware Attack**
- **Sample Analysis + Victim + Demo**
 - Sample SL2010-018 – Windows Credential Stealer
 - Sample SL2009-143 – Network Sniffer Rootkit
 - Sample SL2010-007 – Client-side PDF Attack
- **Conclusions**



About SpiderLabs and Source of Data

About SpiderLabs

SpiderLabs is the **advanced security team** at Trustwave focused on **incident response, penetration testing, application security and security research**.

In addition, SpiderLabs provides **thought leadership** to the entire Trustwave organization and our clients.

SpiderLabs has responded to **hundreds** of security incidents, performed **thousands** of penetration tests and security tests **hundreds** of business applications for organizations ranging from the **largest companies** to nimble start-ups.


Members of the SpiderLabs teams are frequently asked to speak at **global security conferences** such as Black Hat, OWASP, SANS, and DEFCON.



Global Security Report 2010

Incident Response – About the Sample Set

In 2009, SpiderLabs performed 218 breach investigations in 24 countries




- Australia
- Belgium
- Canada
- Chile
- China
- Cyprus
- Denmark
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Germany
- Greece
- Ireland
- Luxembourg
- Malaysia
- Puerto Rico
- Saudi Arabia
- South Africa
- Sri Lanka
- Switzerland
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Virgin Islands

Anatomy of a Data Breach

Three Components:

1. Initial Entry
2. Data Harvesting
3. Exfiltration




Anatomy of a Data Breach – Initial Entry

Top Methods of Entry Included:

- **Remote Access Applications**
 - Remote Desktop, VNC, pcAnywhere
- **3rd Party Connections**
 - MPLS, ATM, frame relay
- **SQL Injection**
- **Email Trojan**
 - We will see an example soon
- **Physical Access**


Anatomy of a Data Breach – Data Harvesting

Top Methods of Harvesting (using Malware):



Anatomy of a Data Breach – Exfiltration

Top Methods of Data Exfiltration:



Network Shares were used to transfer data between organization that had “trusted” links with each other.

Penetration Tests – About the Sample Set

In 2009, SpiderLabs performed 1,894 penetration tests in 51 countries



- Australia
- Argentina
- Belgium
- Brazil
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Chile
- China
- Colombia
- Croatia
- Denmark
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Egypt
- France
- Georgia
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Hong Kong
- India
- Japan
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Macedonia
- Malaysia
- Malta
- Mexico
- Moldova
- Netherlands
- Nigeria
- Rep. of Cape Verde
- Romania
- Russian Federation
- Saudi Arabia
- Singapore
- South Africa
- Sri Lanka
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Taiwan
- Turkey
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- United Kingdom
- United States

Most tests were performed remotely by the SpiderLabs team.

Penetration Tests – Top 10 – Internal Network

| Rank | Vulnerability Name | Circa | Attack Difficulty |
|------|---|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Cache Poisoning | 1999 | Medium |
| 2 | Microsoft SQL Server with Weak Creds for Admin | 1979 | Trivial |
| 3 | Weak Password for Admin Level System Account | 1979 | Trivial |
| 4 | Client Sends LM Response for NTLM Authentication | 1997 | Medium |
| 5 | Crypto Keys Stored Alongside Encrypted Data | 1974 | Easy |
| 6 | Cached Domain Credentials Enabled on Hosts | 1999 | Easy |
| 7 | NFS Export Share Unprotected | 1989 | Medium |
| 8 | Sensitive Information Transmitted Unencrypted | 1991 | Trivial |
| 9 | Sensitive Info Stored Outside Secured Zone | 1993 | Trivial |
| 10 | VNC Authentication Bypass | 2006 | Trivial |

Penetration Tests – Top 10 – Application

| Rank | Vulnerability Name | Circa | Attack Difficulty | OWASP (2010) |
|------|-----------------------------------|-------|-------------------|--------------|
| 1 | SQL Injection | 1998 | Medium | A1 |
| 2 | Logic Flaw | 1985 | Easy | None |
| 3 | Authorization Bypass | 1997 | Easy | A3 |
| 4 | Authentication Bypass | 1960 | Easy | A4/A7 |
| 5 | Session Handling | 1997 | Medium | A3 |
| 6 | Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) | 2000 | Hard | A2 |
| 7 | Vulnerable Third-Party Software | 1960 | Medium | A6 |
| 8 | Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) | 1988 | Hard | A5 |
| 9 | Browser Cache-Related Flaws | 1998 | Medium | None |
| 10 | Verbose Errors | 1980 | Medium | None |

The Global Remediation Plan – The Plan

| Rank | Strategic Initiative |
|------|---|
| 1 | Perform and Maintain a Complete Asset Inventory; Decommission Old Systems |
| 2 | Monitor Third Party Relationships |
| 3 | Perform Internal Segmentation |
| 4 | Rethink Wireless |
| 5 | Encrypt Your Data |
| 6 | Investigate Anomalies |
| 7 | Educate Your Staff |
| 8 | Implement and Follow a Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) |
| 9 | Lock Down User Access |
| 10 | Use Multifactor Authentication Every Where Possible |

Take Aways

- Attackers are using old vulnerabilities
- Organizations do not know what they own or how their data flows
- Blind trust in 3rd parties is a huge liability
- Fixing new/buzz issues, but not fixing basic/old issues
- In 2010, take a step back before moving forward

Malware Landscape Today: Targeted Malware

Customized

- Malware developers are taking a methodical approach to study target systems and environments and testing before developing their toolkits.

Persistent

- Once planted on a system, the malware must survive reboots and even upgrades to be successful while propagating slowly to similar systems.


Covert

- These types of malware go unnoticed for months, even within environments with IT Security “best practices” in place.

Automated


- Targeted malware will do the job for the attackers, leaving them to just wait to receive data being harvested.

Targeted Malware: Memory Parser




- **Captures card data during computer processing**
- **Strength:** Targeted custom malware not easily detectable & can be installed anywhere in the processing chain
- **Weakness:** Seen on Windows platforms only

Targeted Malware: Keystroke Logger



- **Captures card data during swipe**
- **Strength:** Publicly Available, Output encryption, & upload capability
- **Weakness:** Easily detectable by AV & must be installed at point of swipe

Targeted Malware: Network Sniffer



- **Captures card data during network transmission**
- **Strength:** Multi-platform & highly customizable for environment
- **Weakness:** Must listen at a point of (unencrypted) data aggregation to be effective

Anatomy of a Successful Malware Attack

Malware development takes a methodical approach

- Step 1: Identifying the Target
- Step 2: Developing the Malware
- Step 3: Infiltrating the Victim
- Step 4: Finding the Data
- Step 5: Getting the Loot Out
- Step 6: Covering Tracks and Obfuscation (optional)

Before we discuss the samples, we'll cover this process.

Sample SL2010-018 – Windows Credential Stealer

| | | |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Vitals | Code Name: | Don't Call Me Gina |
| | Filename: | fsgina.dll |
| | File Type: | Win32 Dynamic Link Library |
| | Target Platform: | Windows |
| Key Features | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Loads with Winlogon.exe process• Changes Windows Authentication screen to a "Domain login" screen.• Stores stolen credentials in ASCII file on system• Only stores successful logins• Attempts exporting logins via SMTP to an email address. | |
| Victim | <p>Online Adult Toy Store</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• A 100 person company on the West Coast of USA.• Outsourced website hosting and dev to a low cost provider• Admin page allows uploads of files• Database stores card data for 10 minutes post transaction | |

Sample SL2010-018 – Windows Credential Stealer

Demo!

Sample SL2009-143 – Network Sniffer Rootkit

| | | |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| Vitals | Code Name: | Clandestine Transit Authority |
| | Filename: | winsrv32.exe |
| | File Type: | PE 32-bit |
| | Target Platform: | Windows |
| Key Features | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Components of malware embedded inside it - Ngrep, RAR tool and Config file • Uses rootkit to hide malware from Task Manager • Ngrep options contains Track Data regular expression • At the end of the day, it RARs and password protects the temporary output file and creates new file for next day. • Exports compressed and password protected data via FTP | |
| Victim | <p>International VoIP Provider</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seven person company (~80,000 active customers) • 2 methods of payment: website or kiosk • Data Center was in barn; was home to 20 farm cats • Payment Switch support outsourced to 3rd party | |

Sample SL2009-143 – Network Sniffer Rootkit

Demo #2!

Sample SL2010-007 – Client-Side PDF Attack

| | | |
|---------------------|--|--------------------------|
| Vitals | Code Name: | Dwight's Duper |
| | Filename: | Announcement.pdf |
| | File Type: | Portable Document Format |
| | Target Platform: | Windows |
| Key Features | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Malware attached in targeted email looks to be normal PDF• PDF contains 0day exploit (in January it was).• Shell code executes upon PDF launch• Shell code calls a batch file which steals all *.docx, xlsx, pptx and txt files from user's My Documents folder• Stolen files are compressed, password protected and sent to FTP over TCP port 443 | |
| Victim | US Defense Contractor <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provides analytics service to US Military• No inbound access allowed from the Internet without VPN• Egress filtering set to only allow TCP ports 80 and 443• Extremely secure environment compared to previous 3 | |

Sample SL2010-007 – Client-Side PDF Attack

Last One!

Conclusions (What we learned in the past year)

Customization of Malware

- One size fits all is not the mantra of attackers today

Slow and Steady wins the race

- Malware writers are not in for quick and dirty hacks. Since data is stolen in transit, persistency is the key.

AntiForensics

- Detection is not easy for these new age malware. MAC times are modified; random events configured and protection from detection built in.

Automation

- Attackers adding layers to malware to automate tasks so that they don't have to come in to the system and risk detection.

Not Slowing Down

- Since Malware Freakshow last year at SecTor, the techniques have improved significantly.



Questions?



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