

Modeling Paradigms in ACT-R

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1 INTRODUCTION

In his book "Unified Theories of Cognition," Newell (1990) called upon researchers to formulate general theories of cognition in the form of cognitive architectures. A cognitive architecture is a computational modeling platform for cognitive tasks. An architecture should offer representational formats together with reasoning and learning mechanisms to facilitate modeling. For Newell, this was not the most important aspect of an architecture. In addition to facilitating modeling, an architecture should also constrain modeling. Ideally, an architecture should only allow cognitive models that are cognitively plausible, and it should disallow or reject cognitive models that do not correspond to possible human behavior. Newell proposed Soar (see Chapter 3) as his candidate theory, but also mentioned ACT* (Anderson, 1983) as a possible contender.

The ACT-R architecture (Anderson et al., 2004) is the successor of ACT*, and is, contrary to its predecessor, a fully implemented system that is continuously updated and expanded. The current version, ACT-R 6.0, is capable of interacting with the outside world, has been mapped onto brain structures, and is able to learn to interact with complex dynamic tasks. Consistent with Newell's goals, ACT-R is a simulation environment that supports the creation of cognitive models that are capable of predicting and explaining human behavior. As such, it can be instrumental in multi-agent simulations, where an ACT-R-based agent can play the role of a human. ACT-R's main source of constraint is the theory of *rational analysis*. According to rational analysis, each component of the cognitive system is optimized with respect to demands from the environment, given its computational limitations. A consequence of this choice is that *truth* is not a fundamental notion in ACT-R (contrary to systems based on logic), but rather a derivative: useful knowledge is usually true, although true knowledge is not necessarily useful. The memory, performance and learning

systems that have been built on the basis of rational analysis have been validated extensively by many models of classical memory and learning experiments (many of which are discussed in Anderson and Lebiere, 1998).

Contrary to a true symbolic system like Soar, ACT-R assumes both a symbolic and a subsymbolic level to the knowledge represented in its two memory systems – declarative and procedural memory (see also Chapter 4). The subsymbolic level allows fine-grained models of learning and performance that include forgetting and making errors, and can present characteristics usually associated with neural network models. The symbolic level makes it possible to construct models that cover many reasoning steps and larger sets of knowledge. Knowledge in all systems of the architecture, declarative and procedural, and all levels, symbolic and subsymbolic, can be learned by the architecture. To properly explain the architecture, we will start with a general overview, followed by explaining ACT-R's components on the basis of five modeling paradigms.

2 OVERVIEW OF ACT-R

Central to ACT-R is the notion of a declarative memory for facts, and a procedural memory for rules. ACT-R 6.0 extends this basis with a set of modules that interact with the outside world. As a consequence, declarative memory has become another module, whereas the production system implementing procedural memory takes the center position, connecting all the modules together (Figure 2.1).

The production system does not have unlimited access to the various modules, but communicates with them through *buffers*. A buffer can contain only one piece of information at a time. For example, in order to retrieve a certain fact from declarative memory, a request has to be made to declarative memory in the form of a partially specified pattern. The declarative module will then try to complete the pattern, after which the result is placed back in the retrieval buffer, where it can be matched and used by another rule. Production rules in ACT-R therefore serve a switchboard function, connecting certain information patterns in the buffers to changes in buffer content, which in turn trigger operations in the corresponding modules. Production rules in ACT-R do not have the same representational power (and the associated computational problems) as classical production systems. The different modules in the architecture operate asynchronously, and in parallel. Behavior within a module is largely serial. For instance, the declarative model can retrieve only one item at a time, and the visual system can focus its attention on only one item in the visual field at a time.

Items in declarative memory, called *chunks*, have different levels of *activation* to reflect their use: chunks that have been used recently or chunks that are used very often receive a high activation. This activation decays over time if the chunk is not used. Activation also includes a component




FIGURE 2.1. Overview of ACT-R 6.0.

that reflects the degree to which this chunk matches the current context, as well as a noise component that makes activation a stochastic quantity, and retrieval a probabilistic process. The concept of activation follows from rational analysis in that it represents the probability (actually, the log odds) that a chunk is needed and the estimates provided by ACT-R's learning equations represent the probabilities in the environment very well. The level of activation has a number of effects. One effect of activation is that when ACT-R can choose between chunks, it will retrieve the chunk with the highest activation. Activation also affects retrieval time, and whether the chunk can be retrieved at all. The higher a chunk's activation, the faster it can be retrieved, and the more likely that activation is to be above a retrieval threshold. Chunks cannot act by themselves, they need *production rules* for their application. To use a chunk, a production rule has to be invoked that requests it from declarative memory, and another one that harvests it from the retrieval buffer and does something with it. Because ACT-R is a goal-driven theory, chunks are usually retrieved to achieve some sort of goal.

The selection of production rules is also governed by the principle of rational analysis. Each production rule has a real-valued quantity associated with it called utility. This utility is calculated from estimates of the cost and probability of reaching the goal if that production rule is chosen. The unit

of cost in ACT-R is time. ACT-R's learning mechanisms constantly update the parameters used to estimate utility based on experience. If multiple production rules are applicable to a certain goal, the production rule with the highest utility is selected. In both declarative and procedural memory, selections are made on the basis of some evaluation, either activation or utility. This selection process is noisy, so the item with the highest value has the greatest probability of being selected, but other items get opportunities as well. This may produce errors or suboptimal behavior, but it also allows the system to explore knowledge and strategies that are still evolving.

In addition to the learning mechanisms that update activation and utility, ACT-R can also learn new chunks and production rules. New chunks are learned automatically: each time a goal is completed or a perceptual/motor event is registered, it is added to declarative memory. If an identical chunk is already present in memory, these chunks are merged and their activation values are combined. New production rules are learned through the mechanism of production compilation, which combines two rules that fire in sequence into a single rule.

The five modeling paradigms that we will use to discuss ACT-R are the following: *Instance learning* uses previous experiences to guide choices, and focuses on ACT-R's declarative memory and partial matching mechanism. In *Competing Strategies* several strategies compete to solve a problem. ACT-R's utility learning mechanism will ensure that the strategy with the best probability of success for the lowest costs will be used most often. When studying *Individual Differences*, architectural global parameters are identified that correlate with traits and abilities in individuals. Models that incorporate *Perceptual and Motor Processes* use the interaction with the outside world as an additional constraint on behavior. Finally, *Specialization of Task-Independent Cognitive Strategies* allows ACT-R to learn task-specific rules on the basis of general strategies, including interpretation of instructions in declarative memory.

3 INSTANCE LEARNING

Instance learning or instance theory, originally developed by Logan (1988), is a simple but powerful modeling strategy. The basic idea is that as we solve problems, we store the solutions in memory to retrieve them as examples for future problem solving. For example, in tasks where participants have to solve alphabet arithmetic problems, like $D + 3 = ?$, they initially use a counting strategy. Evidence for this is the fact that the solution time increases linearly with the second addend. However, once participants become more experienced, they are able to retrieve answers from memory, which is much faster, and the linear increase of solution time with the second addend disappears.

It is easy to model instance learning in ACT-R. Achieved goals are already automatically stored in declarative memory. Items in declarative memory have an activation value that decays over time, lowering the probability of correct recall, and is boosted by additional rehearsals, increasing the probability of recall. Another aspect of instance learning in ACT-R, which is not covered by Logan's original theory, is that the retrieval attempt can produce an example that is slightly different from the example that is searched for. In the case of $D + 3 = ?$, we might retrieve $B + 3 = E$ instead, because B is similar to D , which would lead to an error. In many other areas requiring less precision than arithmetic, however, an example that is similar to the goal can produce a useful answer, or can serve as a basis for analogy.

3.1 Activation in Declarative Memory

The activation of a chunk determines whether or not it can be retrieved and, if it is retrieved, how much time this takes. As has already been stated, activation reflects past use of a chunk, and its association with the current goal context. The activation of a chunk is the sum of a base-level activation, reflecting its general usefulness in the past, and an associative activation, reflecting its relevance to the current context. The activation of a chunk is defined as

$$A_i = B_i + \sum_j W_j S_{ji} \quad \text{Activation Equation}$$

where B_i is the base-level activation of the chunk i , the W_j 's reflect the attentional weighting of the elements that are part of the current goal, and the S_{ji} 's are the strengths of association from the elements j to chunk i . The activation of a chunk controls both its probability of being retrieved and its speed of retrieval. In the case where there are multiple candidates for retrieval, the chunk with the highest activation has the highest probability of being retrieved.

Base-level activation (B_i) rises and falls with practice and delay according to the equation:

$$B_i = \ln \left(\sum_{j=1}^n t_j^{-d} \right) \quad \text{Base-Level Learning Equation}$$

t_j is the time since the j th practice of an item. This equation is based on the rational analysis of Anderson and Schooler (1991) studying how the pattern of past occurrences of an item predicts the need to retrieve it. They found that the above equation reflects the log odds that an item will reoccur as a function of when it has appeared in the past. In ACT-R, it is assumed that base-level activation would track log odds. Each presentation has an

impact on odds that decays away as a power function (producing the power law of forgetting) and different presentations add up (producing the power law of practice – see Anderson, Fincham & Douglass, 1999). In the ACT-R community 0.5 has emerged as the default value for the time-based decay parameter d over a large range of applications.

There are three equations mapping activation onto probability of retrieval and latency. Probability is the probability that the activation will be greater than a threshold τ .

$$P_i = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(A_i - \tau)/\sqrt{2}s}} \quad \text{Probability of Retrieval Equation}$$

where s controls the noise in the activation levels and is typically set at about 0.4. If there is more than one chunk that matches the request, the following equation describes the probability that a particular chunk will be chosen (assuming its activation is above threshold):

$$P_i = \frac{e^{A_i/\sqrt{2}s}}{\sum_k e^{A_k/\sqrt{2}s}} \quad \text{Probability to Win Competition Equation}$$

where k ranges over all the chunks that match. The time to retrieve the chunk is given as

$$T_i = F e^{-A_i} \quad \text{Latency of Retrieval Equation}$$

where F is a scaling constant mapping activation to (real) time. Given the mechanism of activation, ACT-R is able to predict under what circumstances an instance will be retrieved, and under which circumstances it is not. An example of such a model (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998, chapter 4) is a slight variation on alphabet-arithmetic done by Zbrodoff (1995) where participants have to judge whether an addition with letters and a number is correct, for example “F + 3 = I?”. By varying the addend in the equation (from +2 to +4), they were able to show that at some point people shifted from using counting, where the time to decide increases linearly with the addend, to memory retrieval, where the time to decide is independent of the addend.

3.2 Partial Matching in Instance Retrieval

A slightly more general version of instance retrieval is one in which partial matches are allowed besides exact matches. This is not so useful in alphabet-arithmetic, but in many other tasks an example that is similar to the current goal is useful if an exact example is not available. ACT-R handles partial matching by decreasing the activations of chunks that do not exactly match. This deduction is smaller if the two mismatched values are more similar. If the model tries to retrieve the answer to “F + 3 = ?”, then

the fact “F + 2 = H” would only be mildly penalized, because 2 and 3 are similar. The formula for calculating activation while taking into account mismatches now becomes

$$A_i = B_i + \sum_j W_j S_{ji} + \sum_k P_k M_{ki} \quad \text{Activation Equation}$$

In this equation, M_{ki} represents the mismatch between the requested value and the retrieved value, which can vary between 0 (no mismatch, so no penalty) and -1 (complete mismatch). P_k represents the penalty that is deducted from the activation in case of a complete mismatch. In case of a complete mismatch the full penalty is applied, but when the requested value and retrieved value are similar, only a partial penalty is given.

3.3 Example Model: Sugar Factory

Wallach has modeled an experiment by Berry and Broadbent (1984) in which participants have to control a system called the Sugar Factory (Taatgen & Wallach, 2002). Each trial in the experiment represents a day in which participants have to decide on the size of the workforce (W , between 1 and 9). They are then told the output of the factory for that day (O , between 1 and 12 tons), and are asked the size of the workforce for the next day. The output of the factory not only depends on the size of the workforce, but also on the output of the previous day, and a random factor of $-1, 0$ or 1 , according to the following equation:

$$O(t) = 2W(t) - O(t-1) + \text{random}(-1, 0, 1)$$

If the output is outside the 1...12 range, it is set to the nearest boundary, 1 or 12. Whereas the output increases linearly with the number of workers, it also decreases linearly with the previous day's output, a somewhat counterintuitive relation. Participants were given the goal of bringing the output to 9 tons of sugar per day, and keeping it at that level.

Berry and Broadbent found that participants improve their behavior in this experiment with experience, but are not able to explain the relationship between workers and output after they are done with the task. Wallach's model is therefore based on instances, because instance retrieval can improve performance without the model having an explicit representation of what the rule is. The model stores each experience as a separate chunk in declarative memory, for example:

```
Transition1239
  Isa sugar-goal
  Previous-output 3
  Workers 8
  Output 12
```

This chunk encodes that a previous output of 3 tons of sugar and a workforce of size 8 resulted in a new output of 12 tons of sugar. To determine a workforce level for a new day, the model starts with a goal like this:

Transition1252

Isa sugar-goal
Previous-output 7
Workers ?
Output 9

This goal represents that yesterday's output was 7 tons of sugar, and the desired target is 9 tons of sugar. To determine the workforce level, the model will try to retrieve an experience from declarative memory that matches both the previous output and the new output. To this end it needs the following two rules, which will be represented in a pseudo-English form, with variables in italics:

Retrieval-request-rule

IF the goal is to determine the number of workers to achieve output *G* and the output of the previous day was *O*
THEN send a request to declarative memory for an instance with previous output *O* and output *G*

Retrieval-harvest-rule

IF the goal is to determine the number of workers
AND an instance has been retrieved with *W* workers
THEN set the number of workers to *W*

Given ACT-R's activation mechanism, the chunk that has been used or recreated most often and has the largest similarity to the current goal will be retrieved, for example:

Transition1236

Isa sugar-goal
Previous-output 6
Workers 8
Output 9

Although this example does not exactly match the current goal, it is close enough if it has enough activation (it will be penalized for the mismatch between 6 and 7 in the previous-output slots). Based on this example the model will choose 8 as its next workforce. As the model gathers more experiences, its decisions will also improve, despite the fact that it does not have an explicit representation of the relationships between the task variables. In the experiment, participants improved their on-target decisions from 8

in the first block of 40 trials to 15 in the second block of 40 trials. The model matched this fairly well with 9 and 14 trials, respectively.

4 COMPETING STRATEGIES

Although instance learning is a powerful method to improve performance, there is no real evaluation of the knowledge used. This is an advantage for situations where no information for evaluation is available. If such information is available it can be inserted into the instance, but this does not translate into a higher activation. To directly influence knowledge parameters on the basis of an evaluation, we need to learn the utility of knowledge. An automatic process to keep track of utility is part of ACT-R's procedural memory. One way to use utility learning is to implement several problem-solving strategies using production rules, and have the mechanism keep track of the relative merits of these strategies.

With each production rule, ACT-R maintains two parameters: the estimated cost of the rule, and the estimated probability of success. The utility of a production *i* is defined as

$$U_i = P_i G - C_i \quad \text{Production Utility Equation}$$

where P_i is an estimate of the probability that if production *i* is chosen the current goal will be achieved, *G* is the value assigned to that current goal, and C_i is an estimate of the cost (typically measured in time) to achieve that goal. As we will discuss, both P_i and C_i are learned from experience, whereas *G* is an architectural parameter.

The utilities associated with productions are noisy and on a cycle-to-cycle basis there is a random variation around the expected value given above. The highest-valued production is always selected but on some trials one might randomly be more highly valued than another. If there are *n* productions that currently match, the probability of selecting the *i*th production is related to the utilities U_i of the *n* production rules by the formula

$$P(i) = \frac{e^{U_i/t}}{\sum_j^n e^{U_j/t}} \quad \text{Production Choice Equation}$$

where the summation is over all applicable productions and *t* controls the noise in the utilities. Thus, at any point in time there is a distribution of probabilities across alternative productions reflecting their relative utilities. The value of *t* is about 0.5 in our simulations and this is emerging as a reasonable setting for this parameter.

Learning mechanisms adjust the costs C_i and probabilities P_i that underlie the utilities U_i according to a Bayesian framework. Because the example below is concerned with the learning of the probabilities, we will expand

on that but the learning of costs is similar. The estimated value of P is simply the ratio of successes to the sum of successes and failures:

$$P = \frac{\text{Successes}}{\text{Successes} + \text{Failures}} \quad \text{Probability of Success Equation}$$

However, there is a complication here that makes this like a Bayesian estimate. This complication concerns how the counts for Successes and Failures start out. It might seem natural to start them out at 0. However, this means that P is initially not defined and after the first experience the estimate of P will be extreme at either the value 1 or 0 depending on whether the first experience was a success or failure. Rather P is initially defined as having a prior value θ and this is achieved by setting Successes to $\theta V + m$ and Failures to $(1 - \theta)V + n$ where m is the number of experienced Successes, n is the number of experienced Failures, and V is the strength of the prior θ . As experience ($m + n$) accumulates, P will shift from θ to $m/(m + n)$ at a speed controlled by the value of V . The value of the cost parameter C is estimated in a similar way as the sum of the efforts invested in a goal divided by the total number of experiences (both Successes and Failures):

$$C = \frac{\sum_j \text{Effort}_j}{\text{Successes} + \text{Failures}} \quad \text{Cost Equation}$$

Utility learning is a useful mechanism in tasks where there are multiple cognitive strategies, but where it is unclear which of these strategies is best. The basic setup of a model using competing strategies is to have a set of production rules for each of the strategies. One of these production rules initiates the strategy, and this rule has to compete with the rules that initiate the other strategies. As these rules gain experience, their parameters will reflect their utility, and ACT-R will tend to select the strategy with the highest utility. Depending on the level of utility noise the other strategies will also be sampled occasionally. This makes the system somewhat sensitive to changes in the utility of strategies.

4.1 Example Model: The Building Sticks Task

In the Building Sticks Task (BST), participants have to construct a stick of a certain length using an unlimited supply of sticks of three other lengths (Lovett & Anderson, 1996). For example, the goal might be to build a stick of length 125 using sticks of length 15, 250, and 55. The goal can be reached by either addition or subtraction, so building a 125 stick can be achieved by $55 + 55 + 15$ or by $250 - 55 - 55 - 15$. Instead of being presented with the numbers, sticks of the appropriate length are shown on a computer screen, giving only an approximate idea of the real length of a stick. Participants started with a stick of length 0, and could subsequently select one of the three sticks to either add to or subtract from the current stick. A




FIGURE 22. Experimental results and model fit for the Building Sticks Task. The solid line represents the data, and the dotted line the model prediction.

consequence of only showing approximate lengths is that participants could not calculate the results of their actions beforehand, and had to build the goal stick by trial and error. The task was constructed in such a way that there was always one stick longer than the goal stick, whereas the other two are shorter, and that one of two strategies called *undershoot* and *overshoot* are used to achieve the goal. In the undershoot strategy, the two smaller sticks are used to achieve the goal, first by adding the larger of the two as many times as possible without exceeding the goal, and then continuing with the smaller one. In the overshoot strategy the stick that is larger than the goal is selected first, and then the two smaller sticks are subtracted from that stick in a manner similar to the undershoot strategy until the goal is reached. In the earlier example, both undershoot and overshoot lead to the goal. In almost all of the trials in the experiment, only one of the two led to the goal, whereas the other just missed it. For example the goal might be 101, and the building sticks 10, 155 and 22. The solution can be reached through overshoot ($155 - 22 - 22 - 10$), but not through undershoot.

Although there are only two distinct strategies, they can be chosen for different reasons. One can prefer to always use overshoot or undershoot, but another possibility is to let the choice depend upon which initial step gets you closer to the goal, thereby following a hill-climbing heuristic. For example, in the case of the problem with 15 - 250 - 55 sticks and a goal of 125, the 55 stick brings one much closer to the goal than 250. In the problem with 155 - 22 - 10 sticks and a goal of 101, the 155 stick is closer to the goal.

The solid line in Figure 2.2 shows the result of one of Lovett's experiments. In Problems 1 and 15, both undershoot and overshoot will lead to the

goal, in Problems 2 to 8 and 12 to 14 only overshoot succeeds, and in problems 9 to 11 only undershoot succeeds. The data points indicate the percentage of participants that tried overshoot first. The arrows on the data points indicate which strategy a hill-climbing approach (i.e. the selection first of the stick closest to the goal stick) would favor: an arrow down means undershoot and an arrow up means overshoot. A double arrow indicates that there is no clear difference. The figure clearly shows that up to Problem 6, participants tend to follow a hill-climbing strategy. For example on Problem 5 the arrow points up, meaning overshoot is favored by hill-climbing, and over 80% of the participants select overshoot. By Problem 7 they have discovered that up to then, the only strategy that works is overshoot, so they start using it all the time. However, by Problem 9 overshoot is no longer successful, and participants adapt their strategy choice almost immediately. The same is true for Problems 12 to 14, where overshoot is once more the successful strategy.

The basis for Lovett's model consists of four competing production rules:

1. Always choose overshoot.
2. Always choose undershoot.
3. Decide for overshoot when the large stick clearly brings you closer to the goal than the middle stick.
4. Decide for undershoot when the middle stick clearly brings you closer to the goal than the large stick.

Initially, Rules 3 and 4 were given a slightly higher utility value than Rules 1 and 2, indicating an initial preference for a hill-climbing strategy. However, once the model starts interacting with the experiment, it adjusts its utility values according to experience. The dotted line in the figure shows the model's predictions. By Problem 7, Rule 4 (decide to undershoot) has sufficiently dropped in utility to allow Rule 1 (always overshoot) to win the competition and select overshoot despite the fact that undershoot brings you closer to the goal. In a similar fashion the model adjusts its behavior according to the successes or failures of the four rules later in the experiment.

5 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Cognitive models have the potential to go beyond modeling averages by having models that exhibit variability in behavior, or even by fitting models to individual participants. Individual differences can be explored at many levels, including knowledge and strategy variations, but up to now the variation of global architectural parameters has mainly been explored, more specifically working memory capacity. ACT-R has no separate working memory, but the effects of a limited capacity for unrelated elements can be simulated by decay and interference in declarative memory. Lovett,

Reder and Lebiere (1999) found that individual differences in working memory capacity can be modeled by varying one ACT-R parameter: W , which controls the amount of spreading activation from the goal. To properly explain this, reconsider the activation equation:

$$A_i = B_i + \sum_j W_j S_{ji} \quad \text{Activation Equation}$$

As has been related earlier, the S_{ji} parameters represent the strengths of association between chunks. They are set to $S - \ln(\text{fan}_j)$ where fan_j is the number of chunks associated to chunk j . In many applications S is estimated to be about 2. The W_j s reflect the attentional weighting of the elements that are part of the current goal, and are set to W/n where n is the number of elements in the current goal, and W is a global ACT-R parameter that is by default set to 1. Lovett et al. (1999) explore a variation of W in a model of the modified digit span (MODS) task. In this task, participants had to read aloud sequences of characters made up of letters and digits. After the reading phase they had to recall the digits in the sequence. The number of digits that had to be recalled varied between 3 and 6. The characters were presented at a pace that made it very hard for the participants to do rehearsal. Figure 2.3 shows the performance curves of three of the participants and makes it clear that there are large individual differences. The model of the task is very simple: during the study phase the digits are stored in declarative memory. In the recall phase, the digits have to be retrieved from memory. The probability of success depends on the level of activation (see the Probability of Retrieval Equation on p. 34). To model individuals, Lovett et al. varied the W parameter to match each of the individual performance profiles: a higher W corresponds with a higher activation, and therefore with a higher probability of recall. The figure shows three examples of this, fitting the data (the model is the dotted line) with values of W of 0.7, 1.0 and 1.1. The model matches not only the aggregate performance level but the detailed recall pattern as well.

Apart from the W parameter there are other parameters in ACT-R that can account for individual differences. For example, Taatgen (2002) showed that W , the speed of production rule learning, and the psycho-motor speed correlate with performance at different stages of the learning process.

6 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR PROCESSES

Each of the previous three modeling paradigms seeks to constrain the cognitive theory, either by learning or by capacity limitations. Another source of constraints is interaction with the outside world. As has already been shown in Figure 2.1, ACT-R has several modules that communicate with the outside world. These modules are adapted from the EPIC cognitive architecture developed by Meyer and Kieras (1997). The approach involves




FIGURE 2.3. Proportion of correct recall of the complete list for different list lengths from three participants on the MODS task with model predictions, adapted from Daily et al. (1999).

modeling, in approximate form, the basic timing behavior of the perceptual and motor systems, the output of the perceptual systems and the input to the motor system.

6.1 An Example of Perceptual Modules in Parallel

The ACT-R model described by Byrne and Anderson (2001) for the Schumacher et al. (1997; also reported in Schumacher et al., 2001) experiment is a useful illustration of how the perceptual-motor modules work together. It involves interleaving multiple perceptual-motor threads and has little cognition to complicate the exposition. The experiment itself is interesting because it is an instance of perfect time-sharing. It involved two simple choice reaction time tasks: 3-choice (low-middle-high) tone discrimination with a vocal response and 3-choice (left-middle-right) visual position




FIGURE 2.4. Timeline of how the model performs the Schumacher et al. (1997) task.

discrimination with a manual response. Both of these tasks are simple and can be completed rapidly by experimental participants. Schumacher et al. (1997) had participants train on these two tasks separately, and they reached average response times of 445 ms for the tone discrimination task and 279 ms for the location discrimination task. Participants were then asked to perform the two tasks together with simultaneous stimulus presentation and they were encouraged to overlap processing of the two stimuli. In the dual-task condition, they experienced virtually no dual-task interference – 283 ms average response time for the visual-manual task and 456 ms average response time for the auditory-vocal task.

Byrne and Anderson (2001) constructed an ACT-R model of the two tasks and the dual-task that makes use of the perceptual and motor modules. A schedule chart for the dual-task model is presented in Figure 2.4. Consider the visual-motor task first. There is a quick 50 ms detection of the visual position (which does not require object identification), a 50 ms production execution to request the action, followed by the preparation and execution of the motor action. With respect to the auditory-vocal task, there is first the detection of the tone (which takes longer than detection of visual position), then a production executes requesting the speech and then there is a longer but analogous process of executing the speech.

According to the ACT-R model, there is nearly perfect time sharing between the two tasks because the demands on the central production system are offset in time.

7 SPECIALIZATION OF TASK-INDEPENDENT COGNITIVE STRATEGIES

Production system models are often criticized for the fact that they have all the task-relevant strategies already encoded into their set of production rules, whereas in reality people first have to construct a representation of the task. For example, in the Byrne and Anderson model of perfect dual-tasking the relevant production rules have to be learned first (but see Anderson, Taatgen & Byrne in press for a model that learns the rules). Indeed, participants can achieve perfect dual-tasking only after several days of training. Another goal of rule learning is to generalize from examples. In the Sugar Factory example discussed earlier, generalization was based on single examples. In many other learning situations one can capitalize on regularities found in multiple examples. These goals are achieved in ACT-R by a combination of *production compilation*, a mechanism that learns new rules, and general cognitive strategies.

Production compilation (Taatgen & Anderson, 2002) learns new rules by combining two existing rules that fire in sequence into one new rule. If the first of the two rules makes a request to declarative memory the result of which is used by the second rule, then the retrieved chunk is substituted into the new rule, effectively eliminating the retrieval. By itself, this mechanism only produces more efficient and specialized representations of knowledge that is already available. When the production rules that are compiled are a general cognitive strategy, however, the resulting rules, although specializations of the general strategy, nevertheless generalize the specific experience. An example of this is learning the regular past tense rule in English (Taatgen & Anderson, 2002). A straightforward strategy for finding past tense is to try to apply instance retrieval with the following rule:

Retrieve-past-tense

```
IF      the goal is to find the past tense of a word word
THEN   issue a request to declarative memory for the past-tense of word
```

If this rule finds the past tense of the word, then a second rule uses it as the answer. The interesting case is when declarative memory does not produce the requested past tense, but (through partial matching), a different past tense. In that case we can apply an analogy strategy: find a pattern in the retrieved example and apply it to the current word. Suppose the retrieved

example is a regular verb, then we can apply the pattern to our goal with a rule like this:

Analogy-find-pattern

```
IF      the goal is to find the past tense of word word1
AND     the retrieval buffer contains past tense word2-suffix of word2
THEN   set the answer to word1-suffix
```

Combining the two rules while substituting the retrieved word produces the regular rule:

Learned-rule

```
IF      the goal is to find the past tense of a word word
THEN   set the answer to word-ed
```

In this example the general cognitive strategy of analogy is compiled into a task-specific rule that generalizes a regular example. Other strategies that have been used in combination with production compilation are search for differences (van Rijn et al., 2003) and interpretation of instructions (Anderson et al., 2004; Taatgen & Lee, 2003).

A more elaborate illustration of production compilation is based on a simplified Air Traffic Control task (KA-ATC; Ackerman, 1988). The model of the task is explained in detail in Taatgen (2002) and Taatgen and Lee (2003). In this task, participants direct traffic by choosing a plane that is waiting to land and designating the runway on which the plane should land. There are four runways, the use of which is restricted by rules that relate to the length of the runway, the current weather, and the type of plane that is to be landed. For example, a DC-10 can be landed on a short runway only if the runway is not icy and the wind is below 40 knots. Although participants receive an extended instruction, they tend to forget some rules—especially the more complicated ones regarding weather, plane type, and runway length. The goal of the model is to capture the learning in this task by predicting the improvement in performance of the participants at both a global level and at the level of individual keystrokes.

An example of a production rule from the air traffic control task is the following:

Expert-ATC-rule

```
IF      The goal is to land a plane and a plane has been selected that can
        be landed on the short runway (match of goal buffer)
AND     you are currently looking at the short runway and it is not occu-
        pied (match of visual buffer)
AND     the right hand is not used at this moment (match of manual buffer)
THEN   note that we are moving to the short runway (change to goal
        buffer)
```

AND push the arrow-down key (change to manual-buffer)
 AND move attention to the weather information (change to visual buffer)

This rule reflects knowledge an expert might use at the stage in which a plane has been selected that has to be directed to the short runway. After checking whether the short runway is available, the rule issues the first motor command and also initiates an attentional shift to check the weather, information that might be needed for landing the next plane.

Although this example rule is very efficient, it is also highly task-specific; rules like this have to be learned in the process of acquiring the skill. For novices, the model assumes that all the task-specific knowledge needed about air traffic control is present in declarative memory, having been put there by the instructions given to participants. This knowledge has a low activation because it is new, and might have gaps in it in places where the participant did not properly memorize or understand the instructions. The production rules interpret these instructions and carry them out. Two examples of interpretive rules are these:

Get-next-instruction-rule

IF the goal is to do a certain task and you have just done a certain step (goal buffer)
 THEN request the instruction for the next step for this task (retrieval buffer)

Carry-out-a-push-key-rule

IF the goal is to do a certain task (goal buffer)
 AND the instruction is to push a certain key (retrieval buffer)
 AND the right hand is available (manual buffer)
 THEN note that the instruction is carried out (goal buffer)
 AND push the key (manual buffer)

A characteristic of interpreting instructions is that it results in behavior that is much slower than that of experts: Retrieving the instructions takes time, and during this time not much else happens. Also, parts of the instructions might be forgotten or misinterpreted, leading to even greater time loss. In such cases, the model reverts to even more general strategies, such as retrieving past experiences from memory:

Decide-retrieve-memory-rule

IF you have to make a certain decision in the current goal (goal buffer)
 THEN try to recall an experience that is similar to your current goal (retrieval buffer)

Decide-on-experience-rule

IF you have to make a certain decision in the current goal (goal buffer)
 AND you have retrieved a similar experience that went well (retrieval buffer)
 THEN make the same decision for the current goal (goal buffer)

This experience-based retrieval strategy, which retrieves the experience with the highest activation from declarative memory, is based on the assumption that experiences with a high activation are potentially the most relevant in the current situation. The transition from novice to expert is modeled by production compilation. This mechanism again takes two existing rules that have been used in sequence and combines them into one rule, given that there are no buffer conflicts (for example, as would be the case when both rules specify using the right hand). For example, the two rules that retrieve an instruction and push a key, together with the instruction to press "enter" when the arrow points to the right plane during landing, would produce the following rule:

Learned-enter-rule

IF the goal is to land a plane and your arrow points to the right plane (goal buffer)
 AND the right hand is available (manual buffer)
 THEN note that the instruction is carried out (goal buffer)
 AND push enter (manual buffer)

A rule that retrieves and uses old experiences can also be the source for production compilation. For example, in a situation in which the plane to be landed is a DC-10, the runway is dry, and a previous example in which such a landing was successful on the short runway is retrieved, the following rule would be produced:

Learned-DC-10-rule

IF you have to decide on a runway and the plane is a DC-10 and the runway is dry (goal buffer)
 THEN decide to take the short runway (goal buffer)

New rules have to be recreated a number of times before they can compete with the parent rule, but once they are established they can be the source for even faster rules. Eventually the model will acquire a rule set that performs like an expert. Comparisons with data from experiments by Ackerman (1988; see Taatgen & Lee, 2003) show that the model predicts the overall performance increase (in terms of number of planes landed) and the individual subtasks (e.g., how much time is taken to land a single plane) very well. The model also does reasonably well at the level of




FIGURE 2.5. Numbers of planes landed and landing completion times for trials 1 to 10, data and model predictions.

individual keystrokes. As an illustration, Figure 2.5 shows the actual and predicted number of planes that are landed in a 10-minute trial and the average time to land a plane.

8 WHICH PARADIGM FOR WHAT PROBLEM?

This chapter offers five modeling paradigms that are used frequently by ACT-R modelers. This enumeration is by no means exhaustive nor exclusive: there are models that use other methods, and there are models that use multiple modeling paradigms. The model of the Air Traffic Control task, for example, uses instance learning, perceptual and motor constraints, and has been used to explore individual differences. Nevertheless modeling paradigms can be guidelines and sources of inspiration for setting up a model for a new task. We will start by contrasting the three learning paradigms: utility learning, instance learning and production rule learning.

Utility learning is a useful paradigm in tasks where the possible strategies are relatively clear, and where it can be assumed that people already have some sort of procedural representation of these strategies. When choosing this paradigm it is important to carefully think about how to define the set of strategies. For example, in the Building Sticks Task it is not enough to just have undershoot and overshoot as strategies. To model the participants' behavior, a third strategy, hill-climbing, is necessary. Utility learning can also play a role in models where strategies emerge. In the model of the past tense, for example, the learned regular rule eventually has a lower utility than retrieval of instances, explaining why it is used only if retrieval fails.

Instance learning is useful in situations where the underlying structure is unclear or absent. In alphabet arithmetic, there is no structure in the individual additions, so they have to be learned individually. In the Sugar Factory task there is an underlying rule, but it is unknown to the participants, and hard to derive on the basis of the behavior of the system. It is therefore suitable for tasks normally associated with implicit learning (Wallach & Lebiere, 2003). Instance learning allows for limited generalization, especially when used in combination with partial matching. For generalization to work, though, it must be possible to retrieve the appropriate instance on the basis of activation. Such an instance can be found on the basis of similarity (instances similar to the current goal are useful) or frequency (instances that are retrieved or encountered often are useful). Instance learning cannot take utility into account directly, because a single production rule is responsible for the retrieval process (though see Instance Based Learning Theory – Gonzalez, Lerch & Lebiere, 2003). Instance learning is also less suitable for cases where extrapolation from the examples is needed: if the goal is too far outside the space spanned by the instances, the instance retrieved will probably not be very useful. In constructing an instance-based learning model it is important to carefully consider what should be stored in an instance. In some models a sequence of the last few actions is stored in an instance instead of just the last action (for example, in a model of sequence learning by Lebiere & Wallach, 2001).

Production rule learning can unify the two approaches: rules can be learned out of the instance retrieval process, and these learned rules compete on the basis of utility. To learn interesting rules, some analogy-like process is necessary to use a retrieved instance that is not identical to the goal.

Production rule learning also enables learning from instructions, and therefore supplies the most accurate and complete form of modeling in experimental situations where a participant is supplied with instructions for a task and is asked to perform it. Models using this approach are more complicated; so with any task it is worthwhile to investigate whether one of the more simple paradigms is sufficient.

Modeling perceptual and motor processes also makes a model more complicated, but it may substantially increase the precision of its predictions. Apart from providing precise predictions of the timing of perceptual and motor processes, the approach also acknowledges that cognition is not just a process in the head, but also an interaction with the outside world. For example, it might not be necessary to store information on the screen in the goal, as long as it is available in the visual buffer.

Although most ACT-R models of individual differences have focused on working memory capacity, it is nevertheless interesting to explore variability of behavior in a broader sense in cognitive models. When modeling behavior that is highly variable it is worthwhile to investigate whether noise in the model is sufficient to explain it (e.g., the AMBR model of Lebiere, Anderson & Bothell, 2001). Varying parameters like *W* can provide for additional variability. But individual differences in task performance can also be due to the fact that different individuals employ different strategies. Determining the precise content of an individual's knowledge and strategies is an arduous task, but programs have been proposed to meet it (Gobet & Ritter, 2000).

9 SUMMARY

The focus of the example models in this chapter has been the modeling of human performance data, and not really on modeling agents in multi-agent systems (e.g., Chapter 6). The main reasons are that this is ACT-R's research focus and that most modeling projects involve the development of cognitive models that produce predictions that are matched to human data. Nevertheless ACT-R can be used to program agents that exhibit human-like behavior or serve as a theoretical basis to allow agents to construct a model of their user. The five modeling paradigms discussed can serve as basic tools or templates for such models. Examples of this can be found in Chapter 5, where ACT-R is used to play two-player games. In these games it is important to predict the actions of the opponent in order to anticipate them. Instance learning can be used to keep track of behavioral patterns in the opponent's moves, enabling prediction of the most likely next move. Competing strategies may also be important in game playing: there may be multiple strategies that can be brought to bear on a game, and their utilities may shift if the opponent also adjusts his/her strategies.

Perceptual and motor constraints can be particularly important for agents immersed in virtual environments meant to recreate the sensory constraints of the real world, such as in first-person shooter games. Whether they are all used in a given model or not, all aspects of human cognition are important in some respect in producing human-like agents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by NASA grant NCC2-1226, ONR grant N00014-96-01491 and NWO grant 634.000.002.

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